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Abstract Social networks are the basis of the so called Web 2.0, raising many new
challenges to the research community. In particular, the ability of these networks
to allow the users to share their own personal information with other people opens
new issues concerning privacy and access control. Nowadays the Web has further
evolved into the Social Semantic Web where social networks are integrated and
enhanced by the use of semantic conceptual models, e.g., the ontologies, where the
social information and links among the users become semantic information and links.
In this paper, we discuss which are the benefits of introducing semantics in social
network-based access control. In particular, we analyze and detail two approaches
to manage the access rights of the social network users relying on Semantic Web
languages only, and we highlight, thanks to these two proposals, what are pros and
cons of introducing semantics in social networks access control. Finally, we report
on the other existing approaches coupling semantics and access control in the context
of social networks.
Serena Villata
INRIA, Sophia Antipolis, France, e-mail: serena.villata@inria.fr
Luca Costabello
INRIA, Sophia Antipolis, France e-mail: luca.costabello@inria.fr
Fabien Gandon
INRIA, Sophia Antipolis, France e-mail: fabien.gandon@inria.fr
Catherine Faron-Zucker
I3S, Universite´ Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS, France e-mail: faron@polytech.unice.fr
Michel Buffa
I3S, Universite´ Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS, France e-mail: buffa@unice.fr
1
2 Villata et al.
1 Introduction
One of the key features of the Social Web is the ability to publish, and thus find a
lot of personal and professional information about people. With the advent of the
Social Semantic Web this is even more evident, as underlined by Breslin et al. [5].
The availability of personal and non personal data of the users has both positive
and negative sides. On the one hand, this allows people to share their data, e.g.,
photos, videos, posts, with their friends and the persons they know. On the other
hand, semantic forms of the users’ profiles like FOAF profiles and data can be reused
elsewhere, e.g., what happened with FOAF search engines and aggregators as Plink,
or FoaFSpace. This leads to the need for mechanisms where users can restrict the
access to their data by specifying the attributes the accessors must satisfy to have the
access granted.
In particular, security, protection, and access control represent a major challenge
in content management systems. This issue is central also in collaborative social
Web sites, where the collaborative editing and sharing of the documents raises the
question of the definition of access rights. Moreover, access control is important to
lead to a diffusion of Social Semantic Web platforms to make them able to guarantee
the same kind of authorizations as in standard Social Web platforms like Facebook,
or Google+. Managing the access to the resources is thus one of the major challenges
facing the Social Semantic Web.
In this paper, we address the following research question: What are the benefits
of adopting Semantic Web models and languages for social network-based access
control? Policies, norms and the Semantic Web Trust Layer, as shown in Figure 1, are
usually presented as a set of rules and constraints that model the intended behaviors
of the users. Within W3C, the Policy Languages Interest Group is the forum that
coordinates the efforts of the community around the definition of policy languages,
frameworks and use cases. Apart from W3C activities, one of the most prominent
standard for modelling policies is the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML). Policies can be defined at community level but they can also be defined
at the individual level, e.g., my privacy policies in a social network, e-mail filtering
policies, etc. Policies on the Semantic Web build the foundation for privacy and
access rights of personal or community data, whereas norms in general establish best
practices, e.g., how to publish the data. The definition of both private and community
policies is useful for various further applications such as checking compliance or
conformance, policies alignment, or checking the internal consistency of policies.
We answer the research question by presenting two approaches for defining the
access control policies using Semantic Web languages only. These two approaches
are applied to social semantic networks and show pros and cons of introducing
semantics in social network-based access control.
First, we consider content management systems based on Semantic Web servers,
and we propose an approach for managing access rights to resources based on
Semantic Web models and techniques [6]. We present an ontology dedicated to the
representation of the access rights given on a document to some users or user classes.
We call this ontology AMO, an acronym meaning Access Management Ontology.
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Fig. 1: The Semantic Web stack (from http://www.w3.org/sw).
AMO is made of a set of classes and properties for annotating the resources and
a base of inference rules modeling the access control policy. When applied to the
annotations of resources, these rules enable to control access according to a given
strategy. This declarative modeling as a rule base ensures an easy adaptation of the
ontology to different access control policies and thus avoids modifying annotations
of documents in the case of a change of strategy. In the ISICIL1 research project,
we use the AMO ontology to manage access to resources shared by a network of
technical watchers: documents produced by content management tools, wikis or
blogs, static HTML documents produced by web scraping (i.e. firefox extensions
similar to “Scrapbook”), bookmarks, etc. One of the issues of this project oriented to
Web 2.0 and Semantic Web techniques concerns the management of access to the
resources shared by the social network of watchers. Among the documents produced
by the watchers there are those of a collaborative website run by the semantic wiki
SweetWiki that we developed [7] and that is used in this paper to illustrate the use of
AMO. SweetWiki integrates Semantic Web technologies to improve structure, search
and navigation. More specifically, it associates to wiki pages RDF/S annotations that
make the content of these pages processable by the semantic engine CORESE [10].
Second, we describe the Social Semantic SPARQL Security for Access Control
vocabulary (S4AC2), a lightweight ontology which allows to specify fine-grained
access control policies for RDF data [44, 45, 15]. We adopt exclusively Semantic
Web languages and recycle, when possible, already existing vocabularies. In this
model, we avoid the usual access control lists, often maintained by a sole authority,
because we cannot specify the access restrictions to any particular user, in a context
where the user information is so dynamic. We rely on social tags assigned by the
1 http://isicil.inria.fr/
2 http://ns.inria.fr/s4ac/
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users to data and other users. Moreover, contextual information is also considered in
this model to grant access to users by considering not only their personal informa-
tion, but also additional attributes, e.g., time and location constraints. We adopt the
PRISSMA3 vocabulary [14] to model the user context in which the access request
takes place. Following the widely adopted formalization of context provided by
Dey [21], PRISSMA defines the information context as the sum of the following
three dimensions: the User, modelling the target mobile user (stereotypes or specific
instances), the Device, which represents the mobile device in use, and the Envi-
ronment, the dimension dealing with the physical context where the consumption
takes place. In particular, the S4AC vocabulary defines an access policy as a tuple
composed by an access privilege, stating the kind of privilege the data consumer is
granted to, an evaluation context which is requested to hold when the client query
is performed, the object(s) to be protected by the policy, i.e., the named graphs [9],
and a set of access conditions which have to be verified in order to grant the access
to the consumer. This vocabulary relies on the SPARQL 1.1 language. In particular,
the Access Conditions are expressed through ASK queries, returning true if access
is granted to the data consumer, false otherwise. Access privileges are mapped
to SPARQL primitives through the SPIN vocabulary4. The overall access control
framework allows data providers to specify lightweight access policies to protect their
data, at named graph granularity. The Access Control Manager verifies which named
graphs are accessible by the user, so that the user’s query is run on those graphs
only. The system evaluation shows that access control comes with a cost, and that
performance loss is acceptable when dealing with sensitive data. For the time being,
our lightweight framework assumes the trustworthiness of the information sent by the
data consumer. Moreover, our approach focuses only on SPARQL endpoints. Other
access strategies are out of the scope of this work. Despite the amount of proposals
of access control models [26, 42, 43, 1, 22, 25, 24, 23, 33, 35, 8], none of them
presents a Social Semantic access control model based on Semantic Web languages
only, a pluggable and easy-to-integrate filter for generic SPARQL endpoints without
modifying the endpoint itself, providing access conditions from triple granularity
level up to dataset granularity level, and taking into account the social tags assigned
by the users to their data and other users and the contextual information. Moreover,
we rely on W3C recommendations only, as we do not introduce any new language or
technology.
The two proposals we describe do not deal with access control for the Social
Web in general, but we present two frameworks suitable for the Social Semantic
Web. Our aim is not to provide a privacy manager or a cryptography system, but we
are interested in formalizing, developing and evaluating access control frameworks
which authorize or not the access of the users to the data of the other users, without
considering personal information only.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 presents the ontology AMO
and the use of AMO in SweetWiki, highlighting the adaptability of AMO to different
3 http://ns.inria.fr/prissma/
4 http://spinrdf.org/spin.html
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access control policies. Section 2.2 presents the S4AC ontology, defined for social
access control using the SPARQL 1.1. language, coupled with the PRISSMA on-
tology for the user context definition, with the aim to propose a contextual access
control model for social semantic networks. Section 3 is dedicated to the positioning
with respect to the existing work.
2 Semantic approaches to social network-based access control
2.1 Ontology based Access Management
We present in this section an access control model where access control is based on
an ontology modeling access rights to resources and access control strategies.
2.1.1 The AMO Ontology
In a file system or in a content management system, roles (administrator, owner, etc.)
are associated with users or user groups and different types of access to resources
(writing, reading, etc..) are defined, access to resources varying from one user to
another depending on its role. This analysis led us to define a set of classes and
properties to describe the access rights to resources. This is what we describe in
Section 2.1.1.1.
Content management systems share the same general principles for access control
to resources, however they adopt strategies that may vary from one system to another.
To allow easy adaptation of the ontology supporting the management of access to
resources according to the chosen strategy, this latter is declaratively modeled in
AMO as a base of inference rules that can be modified at leisure without affecting
the annotations of the resources to manage. We describe in Section 2.1.1.2 a rule
base that modelizes one strategy for the access control of documents in the semantic
wiki SweetWiki.
2.1.1.1 AMO Classes and Properties
AMO is based on some basic principles shared by all content management systems:
• Agents of a content management system are the users, user groups, services that
interact with the system.
• These agents have roles. In the case of collaborative editing systems such as
wikis or CMS, these roles are those of guest (agent not registered in the system),
contributor, administrator. Other roles can be modeled depending on the kind of
system.
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• Each role is associated with a list of authorized actions. In the case of collaborative
editing systems, the possible actions on a resource are creation, reading, modifi-
cation and destruction of content, modification of access rights, modification of
the list of agents allowed on a resource, change of the access type defined for a
resource. Other actions can be modeled for other kinds of systems.
• There are different types of access to resources. We choosed to implement a
strategy popular in some collaborative editing systems: a resource can be public
(all users have reading and writing access), private (only authorized agents have
reading and writing access) or semi-private (free reading access, writing access
only to authorized agents). Again, other types of access can be added for other
types of systems.
• Finally, the actions authorized to an agent on a resource depend on the role of the
agent and/or the type of access defined for the resource.
The AMO ontology presented in Figure 2 provides the concepts necessary to represent
this knowledge. The three classes Role, Action and AccessType are central to
AMO. Role is the meta-class of classes Administrator, Contributor and
Guest. Action is the meta-class of classes ReadContent, ModifyContent,
DeleteContents, ModifyUserRights, ModifyAccessType and Modif-
yAuthorizedAgents. Finally, AccessType is the meta-class of class Private,
Public and SemiPublic.
Three classes of the FOAF vocabulary – the standard for social web discussed
in section 3 – are also central in AMO: Agent and its sub-class Group and
Document. They are used as domain or range of properties of AMO and also
in the rules of AMO.
Properties creator and hasAuthorizedAgent associate an agent to a doc-
ument (they have for domain the class Document and for range the class Agent);
hasRole associates a role to an agent and hasActionOnResource an action
to a role; property hasAccessType associates an access type to a document.
In addition, to represent into a model of binary properties the ternary relation
which states that an agent is authorized to perform an action on a resource, we have
reified this relationship by introducing the subclass AuthorizedActionOnRe-
source specializing the class Action, a property hasAuthorizedAction-
OnResource that associates an instance of AuthorizedActionOnResource
to an agent, and the properties hasDocument and hasAction that associate to
an instance of AuthorizedActionOnResource respectively a document and
an action.
AMO is a RDFS vocabulary which can be used to annotate the RDF resources
whose access we want to control.
2.1.1.2 AMO Inference Rules
Content management systems adopt access control strategies to resources that can
vary from one system to another. Rather than varying the annotations of resources
depending on the control strategies, we propose to model declaratively the control
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Fig. 2: AMO classes and properties
Public Semi-Public Private
Guest ReadContent ReadContent
Contributor ReadContent ReadContent
ModifyContent
DeleteContent
AuthorizedAgent ReadContent
ModifyContent
DeleteContent
ModifyAuthorizedAgents
ModifyAccessType
Administrator ReadContent
ModifyContent
DeleteContent
ModifyAuthorizedAgents
ModifyAccessType
ModifyUserRights
Fig. 3: An access control policy modeled in AMO
strategy in the AMO ontology, as a base of inference rules. Some rules may vary
depending on the strategy modeled while the annotations remain unchanged. The
rule base presented here is that of SweetWiki whose strategy of access control is
similar to that of the widely used open source wiki Mindtouch Deki 5.
By default, administrators have all rights on all resources. The contributors have
all rights relative to the content of resources, those reported as agents of a resource by
the author thereof also have some administrative rights on it. Guests are only allowed
to read the content of resources. Figure 3 below summarizes the access rights to a
resource depending on the type of access and the role of the user who tries to access
the resource (horizontally are the types of access resources, vertically user roles).
5 http://www.mindtouch.com/
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We model this strategy in AMO declaratively by six inference rules, each corre-
sponding to a situation described in Figure 3. For example, Rule 1 below specifies
the rights granted to agents of a given resource. Other rules describe general laws
such as a member of a group inherits the roles assigned to her group (Rule 2) or
creator of a resource is an agent of this resource (Rule 3).
These rules are expressed in the SPARQL language, by using the query pattern
CONSTRUCT/WHERE: such a query enables to construct RDF graphs by replacing
the variables of its clause CONSTRUCT by the values that satisfy the clause WHERE
(they are retrieved by searching for potential matches to clause WHERE with the RDF
data available in the content management system). A query CONSTRUCT/WHERE
can therefore be seen as a rule applied in forward chaining, with clause WHERE the
premise and clause CONSTRUCT the conclusion. These rules however can also be
used in backward chaining, as is the case in the semantic engine Corese.
Rule 1:
CONSTRUCT {
?agent amo:hasAuthorizedActionOnResource ?a
?a amo:hasResource ?resource
?a amo:hasActionOnResource amo:ReadContent.
?a amo:hasActionOnResource amo:ModifyContent.
?a amo:hasActionOnResource amo:DeleteContent.
?a amo:hasActionOnResource amo:ModifyAccessType.
?a amo:hasActionOnResource amo:ModifyAuthorizedAgents }
WHERE {
?resource rdf:type foaf:Document.
?resource amo:hasAuthorizedAgent ?agent }
Rule 2:
CONSTRUCT {
?agent amo:hasRole ?role }
WHERE {
?group amo:hasRole ?role
?group foaf:member ?agent }
Rule 3:
CONSTRUCT ?resource amo:hasAuthorizedAgent ?agent
WHERE ?resource amo:creator ?agent
This declarative modeling of the strategy of access rights management ensures
easy maintenance. Changing rights of a class of users – and this for all resources
involved – will only require the addition or deletion of triples statements in the
conclusion of a rule. Similarly, the addition of new roles will only require the
addition of a class representing this role and the rules representing the access rights
associated with that role.
2.1.2 Access Rights Management in SweetWiki
The AMO ontology has been used in the ISICIL project to annotate resources
shared by a social network of business watchers. The management of access to these
resources in the engine SweetWiki was based on (1) the exploitation of these semantic
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annotations, (2) inferences on these annotations based on AMO rules and (3) the
formulation of SPARQL queries to retrieve knowledge about the authorized access
to a specific user on a given resource. In SweetWiki, annotations of resources are
based on FOAF, SIOC and AMO ontologies and SPARQL queries are used in most
of the features implemented: RDF annotations feed the semantic engine CORESE
embedded in SweetWiki. In particular, by using the approximate search possibilities
of Corese[11, 12] and a system of semantic tagging of documents, SweetWiki offers
an “intelligent” browsing mechanism enhanced by suggestions.
2.1.2.1 Annotation of Ressources with AMO
When creating a wiki page, the identity of its creator is registered and also the
type of access to the page that is decided by her and possibly one or more
agents authorized on the page, also designated by the creator. In SweetWiki
this knowledge is represented into RDF annotations associated with the created
pages. For example, Annotation 1 below results from the creation of a private
wiki page by the user AnnaKolomoiska who stated that agent MichelBuffa
is authorized on this page. This annotation uses the AMO properties creator,
hasAuthorizedAgent and hasAccessType (and the class WikiArticle
of the SIOC vocabulary).
Annotation 1:
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://seetwiki.i3s.unice.fr/AMO.rdfs#" ... >
<sioc:WikiArticle rdf:about="#TestPage">
...
<creator rdf:resource="#AnnaKolomoiska"/>
<hasAuthorizedAgent rdf:resource="#MichelBuffa"/>
<hasAccessType rdf:resource="#Private"/>
</sioc:WikiArticle>
</rdf:RDF>
When registering a user in SweetWiki, this information is represented in an
RDF annotation. For example, Annotation 2 below states that MichelBuffa is a
contributor to the wiki. It uses the AMO class Contributor and AMO property
hasRole (and the class Agent of the FOAF vocabulary discussed in section 3).
Other annotations express knowledge relative to the user groups of the wiki. For
example, Annotation 3 states that AnnaKolomoiska and CatherineFaron are
members of the administrator group of the wiki. It uses for that the AMO prop-
erty hasRole (and the FOAF classes Group and Agent and the FOAF property
member).
Annotation 2:
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://seetwiki.i3s.unice.fr/AMO.rdfs#" ... >
<foaf:Agent rdf:about="#MichelBuffa">
...
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<hasRole rdf:resource="#Contributor"/>
</foaf:Agent>
</rdf:RDF>
Annotation 3:
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://seetwiki.i3s.unice.fr/AMO.rdfs#" ... >
<foaf:Group rdf:about="#AdminGroup">
<foaf:member>
<foaf:Agent rdf:about="#AnnaKolomoiska"/>
</foaf:member>
<foaf:member>
<foaf:Agent rdf:about="#CatherineFaron"/>
</foaf:member>
<hasRole rdf:resource="#Admin"/>
</foaf:Group>
</rdf:RDF>
2.1.2.2 Inferences with the Rule Base of AMO
Applied to the annotations of resources, AMO rules enable to infer the rights
of the wiki users on these resources. For example, consider again Rule 1. Its
premise matches with Annotation 1 that illustrates Section 2.1.2.1: the resource
TestPage is of type WikiArticle – a class of the SIOC vocabulary, subclass
of the class Document of the FOAF vocabulary – and TestPage is related to
the user MichelBuffa with the hasAuthorizedAgent property. Applied on
Annotation 1, Rule 1 allows to conclude that MichelBuffa has the read, modify
and delete permissions on the content of the annotated resource TestPage and the
modify permission on its type of access and its list of agents.
Similarly, Rule 2 applied on Annotation 3 allows to conclude that user CatherineFaron
has the administrator role. Another rule of AMO (not provided here) describes gen-
eral rights of an agent having the administrator role on any resource. It enables
to conclude that CatherineFaron owns all the rights on the specific resource
TestPage.
Finally, Rule 1 and Rule 3 applied on Annotation 1 enable to conclude that user
AnnaKolomoiska, creator of resource TestPage, has the rights of an agent of
that resource: read, modify and delete rights on its content and modify right on its
type of access and its list of agents.
2.1.2.3 SPARQL Requests for Access Rights Management
Access to a particular resource by a given user depends, as all the actions in Sweet-
Wiki, on the answers to a SPARQL query provided by the Corese engine launched
on the base of resource annotations. For this, Corese combines backward chaining
on the AMO rule base and matching of queries with the annotation base. For ex-
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ample, the answer to the following SPARQL query will indicate whether the user
CatherineFaron is allowed to modify the content of the resource TestPage:
Query 1:
prefix amo: <http://sweetwiki.unice.fr/AMO.rdfs#>
ASK {
<http://sweetwiki.unice.fr#CatherineFaron>
amo:hasAuthorizedAccessOnResource ?x
?x amo:hasActionOnResource amo:ModifyContent
?x amo:hasResource <http://sweetwiki.unice.fr#TestPage> }
Other SPARQL queries are formulated to support all the functionnalities of
SweetWiki. For instance, the processing of the following query will provide the list
of all the users having some rights on resource TestPage and for each of them it
will state the list of her authorized actions onTestPage:
Query 2:
prefix amo: <http://sweetwiki.unice.fr/AMO.rdfs#>
SELECT ?agent ?action {
?agent amo:hasAuthorizedAccessOnResource ?x
?x amo:hasActionOnResource ?action
?x amo:hasResource <http://sweetwiki.unice.fr#TestPage> }
order by ?agent
2.2 Context-Aware Access Control for Semantic Social Networks
We present in this section a new access control model where access control is based
on the features of the user accessing the protected data, and context has an important
role in determining whether the user is granted access or not. This new model called
S4AC-PRISSMA enhances the expressive power of the AMO model, and allows the
data provider to protect in a finer-grained way her resources.
2.2.1 The Context-aware Access Control Model
In this section, we present our access control model. The access control model is
built over the notion of Named Graph [9], thus supporting fine-grained access control
policies, including the triple level (Enforcing permission models is an envisioned
use case for RDF named graphs6). We rely on named graphs to avoid depending
on documents (one document can serialize several named graphs, one named graph
can be split over several documents, and not all graphs come from documents7). At
conceptual level, our policies can be considered as access control conditions over
6 http://bit.ly/w3rdfperm
7 The discussion about the use of named graphs in RDF 1.1 can be found at http://www.w3.
org/TR/rdf11-concepts
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g-boxes8 (according to W3C RDF graph terminology), with semantics mirrored in
the SPARQL language.
The model is grounded on the Social Semantic SPARQL Security for Access
Control Ontology (S4AC). An overview of S4AC lightweight vocabulary is provided
in Figure 4. Our access control model is integrated with the models adopted in the
Social Semantic Web. In particular, S4AC reuses concepts from SIOC9, SKOS10,
WAC11, NiceTag12, SPIN13, Dublin Core14, and the access control model as a whole
is grounded on further existing ontologies, such as FOAF15 and RELATIONSHIP16.
AccessConditionSet
AccessCondition
DisjunctiveACS
ConjunctiveACS
subClassOf
subClassOf
AccessPolicy
AccessEvaluationContext
hasAccessEvaluationContext
hasAccessConditionSet
hasAccessCondition
AccessPrivilegehasAccessPrivilege
isicil:Context
owl:isEquivalentTo
nicetag:isRelatedTo
rdfs:Literal
appliesTo
hasQueryAsk
Fig. 4: An overview of the S4AC ontology. Core classes are in grey.
The main component of the S4AC model is the Access Policy, as presented in
Definition 1. Roughly, an Access Policy defines the constraints that must be satisfied
to access a given named graph or a set of named graphs. If the Access Policy is
satisfied then the data consumer is allowed to access the data. Otherwise, the access
is not granted. The constraints specified by the Access Policies may concern the
data consumer, i.e., the user or the environment in which the user is querying the
SPARQL endpoint, or any given combination of these dimensions.
Definition 1. (Access Policy) An Access Policy (P) is a tuple of the form
P = 〈ACS,AP,T,R,AEC〉
8 http://bit.ly/graphterm
9 http://rdfs.org/sioc/spec/
10 http://www.w3.org/TR/skos-reference/
11 http://www.w3.org/wiki/WebAccessControl
12 http://ns.inria.fr/nicetag/2010/09/09/voc.html
13 http://spinrdf.org/
14 http://dublincore.org/documents/dcmi-terms/
15 http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/
16 http://vocab.org/relationship/
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where (i) ACS is a set of Access Conditions to satisfy, (ii) AP is an Access Privilege,
(iii) T is the tag of the set of resources to be protected by P, (iv) R is the resource(s)
to be protected by P, and (v) AEC is the Access Evaluation Context of P.
An Access Condition, as defined in Definition 2, expresses a constraint which
needs to be verified in order to have the Access Policy satisfied. Notice that both T
and R represent the data to protect. The difference is that T refers to the set of named
graphs associated with a certain tag, and R refers to the URI(s) of the specific named
graph(s).
Definition 2. (Access Condition) An Access Condition (AC) is a condition which
tests whether or not a query pattern has a solution.
In the S4AC model, we express an Access Condition as a SPARQL 1.1 ASK
query17.
Definition 3. (Access Condition verification) If the query pattern has a solution (i.e.,
the ASK query returns true), then the Access Condition is said to be verified. If the
query pattern has no solution (i.e., the ASK query returns false), then the Access
Condition is said not to be verified.
Example 1. An example of Access Condition, which is verified only if the data
consumer is a collaborator of the provider of the resource to protect, is the following:
PREFIX dcterms: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/>
PREFIX rel: <http://purl.org/vocab/relationship/>
ASK {?resource dcterms:creator ?provider.
?provider rel:collaboratesWith ?consumer.}
Each Access Policy P is composed by a set of Access Conditions, as defined in
Definition 4.
Definition 4. (Access Condition Set) An Access Condition Set (ACS) is a set of
access conditions of the form ACS = {AC1,AC2, . . . ,ACn}.
Roughly, the verification of an Access Condition Set returns an answer of the kind
true/false. We consider two standard ways to provide such an evaluation: conjunc-
tively and disjunctively.
Definition 5. (Conjunctive Access Condition Set) A Conjunctive Access Con-
dition Set (CACS) is a logical conjunction of Access Conditions of the form
CACS = AC1∧AC2∧ . . .∧ACn.
17 http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/#ask
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Definition 6. (Conjunctive ACS evaluation) A CACS is verified if and only if every
contained Access Condition is verified.
Definition 7. (Disjunctive Access Condition Set) A Disjunctive Access Condition Set
(DACS) is a logical disjunction of Access Conditions of the form
DACS = AC1∨AC2∨ . . .∨ACn.
Definition 8. (Disjunctive ACS evaluation) A DACS is verified if and only if at least
one of the contained Access Conditions is verified.
The second component of the Access Policy is the Access Privilege. The privilege
specifies the kind of operation the data consumer is allowed to perform on the
resource protected by the Access Policy.
Definition 9. (Access Privilege) An Access Privilege (AP) is a set of allowed opera-
tions on the protected resources of the form AP = {Create,Read,U pdate,Delete}.
We model the Access Privileges as four classes of operations in order to maintain
a close relationship with CRUD-oriented access control systems. This relationship
allows a finer-grained access control than simple read/write privileges as in WAC,
and it suggests to the data providers how to specify the access privileges, following
the example of CRUD-oriented systems, as we will discuss in relation to the user
interface. The idea is that in the Social Semantic Web, there is a difference in allowing
the users who ask to access my data to update my data or to delete my data. We
distinguish the Update, Create and Delete operation to let the user to specify with
a deeper degree of detail what the consumers are allowed to perform on her data.
Moreover, we relate the four privilege classes to the SPARQL 1.1 query and update
language. This matching is realized with the skos:related property through the
SPIN ontology. The latter models the primitives of the SPARQL query and update
languages (e.g., SELECT, INSERT DATA, etc.) as SPIN classes. We show how this
matching is actually used by our framework in Section 2.2.2.
As previously explained, policies protect data at named graph level. We offer two
different ways of specifying the protected object: the provider may target one or
more given named graphs, or it may target a set of named graphs with a common
tag. The former is achieved by providing the URI(s) of the named graph(s) to protect
using the s4ac:appliesTo property. The latter is accomplished by listing the
tags of the named graphs to protect with the property nicetag:isRelatedTo.
In this case, the assumption is that the named graphs have been annotated with such
metadata.
The Access Policy is associated to an Access Evaluation Context. The latter
provides an explicit link between the policy and the actual context data (in the case
of the mobile context it is modelled with PRISSMA) that will be used to evaluate the
Access Policy.
Definition 10. (Access Evaluation Context) An Access Evaluation Context (AEC) is
a list of predetermined bound variables of the form
AEC = (〈var1,val1〉,〈var2,val2〉, . . . ,〈varn,valn〉).
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In this paper, we focus on the mobile context, thus the Access Evaluation Context
list is composed only by a couple AEC = (〈ctx,URIctx〉). We map therefore the
variable ctx, used in the policy’s Access Conditions, to the URI identifying the actual
user context in which the SPARQL query has been performed. More specifically, the
Access Evaluation Context is implemented as a SPARQL 1.1 BINDINGS Clause18
to constrain the ASK evaluation, i.e. “BINDINGS ?ctx {(URIctx)}”.
The choice and the design of a context model necessarily need a context definition
first. We agree on the widely-accepted proposal by Dey [21]:
Definition 11. (Context) “Context is any information that can be used to characterize
the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered
relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including the user and
applications themselves” [21].
More specifically, we rely on the work by Fonseca and colleagues 19, that we adopt
as a foundation for our proposal. The mobile context is seen as an encompassing
term, an information space defined as the sum of three different dimensions: the
mobile User model, the Device features and the Environment in which the action is
performed.
The social semantic web scenario favours the adoption of an ontology-based model.
As pointed out by Korpipa¨a¨ and Ma¨ntyja¨rvi [28], an ontological approach leads to
simple and extensible models. A large number of ontology-based context models
relying on Dey’s definition have been proposed in the latter years, as summarized by
Bolchini et al. [4] (e.g. CoBrA, CoDaMoS, SOCAM). These works are grounded on
RDF and provide in-depth context expressivity, but for chronological reasons they
are far from the best practices common on the social semantic web (e.g. lightweight
approach, heavy interlinking with other vocabularies), thus discouraging the adoption
and re-use in the Web community. Our context-aware access control framework
adopts PRISSMA, a lightweight vocabulary originally designed for context-aware
adaptation of RDF data [14]. PRISSMA has been originally designed to express the
contextual conditions under which activate a given representation for RDF [14]. In
this paper we propose context-based access policies, and we therefore need a vocabu-
lary to model mobile context. We thus re-use classes and properties of the PRISSMA
vocabulary for a different purpose, i.e. to represent contextual conditions for access-
ing RDF graphs. PRISSMA provides classes and properties to model core mobile
context concepts, but is not meant to deliver yet another mobile contextual model:
instead, well-known lightweight vocabularies and recent W3C recommendations are
reused (Figure 6). Moreover, it does not provide a comprehensive, exhaustive context
representation: the approach is to delegate refinements and extensions to domain
specialists. The overall context is modelled by the class prissma:Context and
is determined by the following dimensions:
18 http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-federated-query/#update
19 http://bit.ly/XGR-mbui
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:policy1 a s4ac:AccessPolicy; 
           s4ac:appliesTo :alice_data; 
           s4ac:hasAccessPrivilege [a s4ac:Update];
           s4ac:hasAccessConditionSet :acs1.
:acs1 a s4ac:AccessConditionSet; 
        s4ac:ConjunctiveAccessConditionSet;
        s4ac:hasAccessCondition :ac1,:ac2.
:ac1 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:user ?u. 
               ?u foaf:knows ex:alice#me.}""".
:ac2 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:environment ?env. 
               ?env prissma:based_near ?p. 
               FILTER (!(?p=ex:ACME_boss#me))}""".
ACCESS POLICY
RESOURCE TO PROTECT
ACCESS PRIVILEGE
ACCESS CONDITIONS
TO VERIFY
(a)
@prefix : <http://example/contextgraphs/bobCtx>
[other prefixes omitted]
<http://example/contextgraphs/bobCtx>{
:ctx a prissma:Context; 
        prissma:user :usr;
        prissma:device :dev; 
        prissma:environment :env.
:usr a prissma:User; 
        foaf:name "Bob";
        foaf:knows ex:alice#me.
:dev a prissma:Device; 
        hard:deviceHardware :devhw;
        soft:deviceSoftware :devsw. 
:devhw a hard:DeviceHardware;
          dcn:display hard:TactileDisplay. 
:devsw a soft:DeviceSoftware;
          soft:operatingSystem :devos. 
:devos a soft:OperatingSystem;
          common:name "Android".
:env a prissma:Environment; 
        prissma:motion "no";
        prissma:nearbyEntity :ACME_boss#me;
        prissma:currentPOI :ACMEoffice. 
:ACMEoffice a prissma:POI;
              prissma:poiCategory example:Office; 
              prissma:poiLabel example:ACMECorp.
}
THE CONSUMER'S
CONTEXT
THE USER DIMENSION
THE DEVICE DIMENSION
THE ENVIRONMENT 
DIMENSION 
(b)
Fig. 5: The Access Policy protecting :alice data (a) and Bob’s sample mobile
context in TriG notation (b).
Social Semantic Network-based Access Control 17
UserDevice
Environment
Contextdevice user
environment
POI
Activity
poiLabel
poiCategory
ao:activity
nearbyEntity
motion
foaf:Personrdfs:subClassOfdcn:Device
rdfs:subClassOf
geo:SpatialThing rdfs:subClassOf
Time
time:TemporalEntity
descriptivePeriod
owl:Thing
geo:Pointfoaf:based_near
ao:time
rdfs:subClassOf
Fig. 6: The PRISSMA vocabulary at a glance.
Definition 12. (User Dimension) The User represents the mobile requester associ-
ated to a Context and consists in a foaf:Person sub-class. It can model both
stereotypes and specific users.
Definition 13. (Device Dimension) The Device consists in a structured representa-
tion of the mobile device used to access the RDF store.
The Device class inherits from W3C Delivery Context Ontology 20 dcn:Device,
providing an extensible and fine-grained model for mobile device features and
enabling device-specific access control.
Definition 14. (Environment Dimension) The Environment is the model of the phys-
ical context in which the resource consumption takes place.
Different dimensions are involved in modelling the surrounding environment.
Location is modelled with the notion of Point of Interest (POI). The POI class
consists in a simplified, RDFized version of the W3C Point of Interest Core specifica-
tions21. Time is modelled extending the time:TemporalEntity class22. Other
dimensions are considered: the motion property associates any given high-level
representation of motion to a Environment. The proximity of an object might
determine access restrictions: nearby objects are associated to the Environment with
the nearbyEntity property. The Activity class consists in a placemark aimed
at connecting third-party solutions focused on inferring high-level representations
of user actions (e.g.‘running’, ‘driving’, ‘shopping’, etc). Further refinements and
extensions are delegated to domain specialists (e.g. if dealing with indoor location,
the room vocabulary23 could be easily integrated).
Example 2. We now present an example of Access Policy with a conjunctive Access
Condition Set associated to an Update privilege (Figure 5a). The policy protects the
20 http://bit.ly/dc-ontology
21 http://www.w3.org/TR/poi-core/
22 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time
23 http://vocab.deri.ie/rooms
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named graph :alice data and allows the access and modification of the named
graph only if the consumer (i) knows Alice, and (ii) is not located near Alice’s boss.
Figure 5b visualizes a sample mobile context featuring all the dimensions described
above. The user, Bob, knows Alice and is currently at work, near his and Alice’s
boss. Bob is using an Android tablet with touch display and he is not moving.
When dealing with mobile context, other issues need to be considered beyond
context-model definition, such as context fetch, context trustworthiness and privacy.
The present paper assumes that context data is fetched and pre-processed beforehand.
PRISSMA supports both raw context data fetched directly from mobile sensors
(e.g. GPS location, mobile features) and refined information processed on board or
by third-party, server-side services (e.g. POI resolution or user activity detection).
The trustworthiness of contextual information sent by mobile consumers should
not be taken for granted. The User’s identity needs to be certified: this is an open
research area in the Web, and initiatives such as WebID24 specifically deal with this
issue. Hulsebosch et al. [26] provide a survey of context verification techniques (e.g.
heuristics relying on context history, collaborative authenticity checks). A promising
approach is mentioned in Kulkarni and Tripathi [31], where context sensors are
authenticated beforehand by a trusted party. We plan to tackle the issue of context-
verification in future work. Privacy concerns arise while dealing with mobile user
context. We are aware that sensible data such as current location must be handled
with a privacy-preserving mechanism. In the present proposition, we do not address
this issue, nor the problem of context integrity.
Further details of the S4AC model include, among others: the specification of the
creator of the policy (sioc:hasCreator) to keep track of this information in the
Social Semantic platform, the creation date (dcterms:created), the specification
of the variables used in the access conditions of the policies and their description in
natural language adopted in the user interface of the framework to help the provider
reusing others’ policies, and a skos:prefLabel property associated to the Access
Conditions to provide a sort of “explanation” to the consumer in case she cannot
access the data (following the example of AIR [27]). Moreover, we are able to manage
the fact that only a maximum number of accesses is granted, as in Giunchiglia et
al. [24], by means of an Access Condition, and we can grant random access to a
resource (e.g. ASK{FILTER(rand()>0.5)}.
The semantics of our Access Control Policies is mirrored in the semantics of
the SPARQL language, in particular concerning the ASK query and the BINDINGS
clause. The result of the verification of each access condition is composed, in case of
multiple conditions, conjunctively or disjunctively, and this combination is the overall
result of the policy evaluation. The Access Privilege and the resource to protect are
components of the policy which do not concur to its verification. All the semantics
of our Access Policies relies on the semantics of the ASK queries combined with the
contextual BINDINGS.
Conflicts among policies might occur if data provider adds Access Conditions
with contrasting FILTER clauses. For instance, it is possible to define positive
24 http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/
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and negative statements such as ASK{FILTER(?user=<http://example#bob>)}
and ASK{FILTER(!(?user=<http://example#bob>))}. If these two Access Con-
ditions are applied to the same data, a logical conflict arises. This issue is handled
in our framework by evaluating policies applied to a resource in a disjunctive way.
This means that in the example above, if the consumer satisfies one of the two access
conditions, then the access is granted to her. This is not satisfactory in many situa-
tions, thus we expect to add a mechanism, following the example of [20], to avoid
the insertion of conflicting policies as a future work.
Example 3. Consider the following scenario. Alice is attending a music festival and
she uploads some content to the social platform. She prefers to share these contents
to all the people knowing her but not to those who are friends of her boss. The
policy (Figure 5a) protects the named graph containing Alice’s reviews of concerts
(:alice reviews visualized in Figure 7).
ex:29900 a bibo:Article;
dcterms:title "Great concert with Bob!";
dcterms:date "2010";
dcterms:creator example:alice#me;
bibo:abstract "Really enjoyed Coldplay".
ex:29655 a bibo:Article;
dcterms:title "Disappointed";
dcterms:date "2010";
dcterms:creator example:alice#me;
bibo:abstract "Not up to the standards".
Fig. 7: The content of the named graph :alice reviews containing the reviews
authored by Alice.
FIgure 8 presents some examples of the ASK queries which may be associated to
the access conditions. Cond1 grants the access to those users who have a relationship
of kind “colleagues” with the provider. Cond2 grants the access to the friends of
the provider, and Cond3 extends this access condition also to the friends of friends.
Cond4 is more complicated25. It grants the access to those users that are marked
with a specified tag. To specify the tag, we use again the NiceTag ontology which
allows to define the relationship among the resources and the tags for each tagging
action. Negative access conditions are allowed, where we specify which user cannot
access the data. This is expressed, as shown in Cond5, by means of the FILTER
clause, and access is granted to every user except bob. Cond6 expresses an access
condition where the user can access the data only if he is a minimum lucky, e.g., one
chance out of two. Cond7 provides a positive exception where only a specific user
can access the data, it is the contrary of Cond5. Cond8 grants the access to users who
are members of a particular group, to which the provides belongs too.
25 The GRAPH keyword is used to match patterns against named graphs.
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ASK { ?resource dcterms:creator ?provider .
 ?provider rel:hasColleague ?user }
ASK { ?resource dcterms:creator ?provider .
 ?provider rel:hasFriend ?user }
ASK { ?resource dcterms:creator ?provider .
 ?provider rel:hasFriend{1,2} ?user }
ASK { ?resource dcterms:creator ?provider .
 ?provider dcterms:creator ?g . 
 GRAPH ?g { ?user nicetag:hasCommunitySign ?tag }}
ASK { FILTER(! (?user= <http://MyExample.net#sery>))}
ASK { FILTER(random()>0.5) }
ASK { ?resource dcterms:creator ?provider .
 ?provider sioc:member_of ?g .
 ?user sioc:member_of ?g }
cond1
cond3
cond2
cond6
cond4
cond5
cond7
cond8
ASK { FILTER(?user= <http://MyExample.net#bob>)}
Fig. 8: Examples of access conditions.
2.2.2 The Access Control Manager
The Access Control Manager (ACM), visualized in Figure 9, is the core module
which allows the data providers to define and check the Access Conditions.
The framework is developed in the following way:
1. the data consumer queries the SPARQL endpoint to access the content, and at
the same time, the social platform sends the user information coupled with the
query. This data is sent as an INSERT DATA statement to build the named graph
representing the user’s data. Summarizing, the user sends two SPARQL queries
to the endpoint, the first one for accessing the datastore, and the second one for
providing her personal information. A caching mechanism can be introduced here
to avoid sending the personal information every time a query is performed.
2. the query of the consumer is not directly processed by the SPARQL endpoint, but
it is filtered by the Access Control Manager.
3. the Access Control Manager selects the policies concerning the consumer’s query,
and after their evaluation, it returns the set of named graphs the consumer is
granted access to.
4. the query of the consumer is processed only on the accessible named graphs.
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5. the result of the query is sent to the consumer.
prov
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Fig. 9: The Access Control Manager.
The core of our framework is the Access Enforcement Module. The aim of this
component is twofold: first, the module selects the Access Policies to assess, and
second, it verifies the set of Access Conditions included in the selected policies to
allow or not the access. In the following, we describe the two algorithms used to
decide whether the consumer is allowed to access or not the data.
ASK{?context a isicil:Context.
?context isicil:user ?u.
?u foaf:knows ex:alice#me.}
BINDINGS ?context {(example:actualCtx1)}
ASK {?context a isicil:Context.
?context isicil:user ?u.
?u rel:hasFriend ?f.
FILTER (!(?f=ex:ACME_boss#me))}
BINDINGS ?context {(example:actualCtx1)}
Fig. 10: The Access Conditions bound to the actual user context with the BINDINGS
clause.
Algorithm 1 is the overall algorithm for the query execution with the access
enforcement. The input of the algorithm is the consumer’s query Q and the RDF
graph Gctx modeling the information of the consumer. We assume the existence of
a repository of access policies APS. The algorithm starts by saving the consumer’s
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DELETE {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Concert_tours>. }
INSERT {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Music_performance>. }
WHERE {ex:article a bibo:Article}
(a)
DELETE {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Concert_tours>. }
INSERT {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Music_performance>. }
USING :peter_data 
USING NAMED :peter_data
WHERE {ex:article a bibo:Article}
THE NAMED GRAPH ACCESSIBLE
BY THE CONSUMER
(b)
Fig. 11: The SPARQL query issued by Bob’s mobile client (a) and the filtered version
(b).
graph in a local cache (line 1). The set of selected accessible named graph NGS
is empty at the beginning of the algorithm execution (line 3). The selection of the
Access Policies is addressed by the sub-routine Access Policies Selection (line
4), which returns the set of Access Policies the query is concerned by. Then, the
algorithm runs all the Access Conditions composing the selected policies (lines 7-10).
For each policy, depending on the kind of Access Conditions Set, i.e., conjunctive
or disjunctive, if the policy is verified then the named graph to which the policy
allows the access is added to the set of accessible named graphs (lines 11-12).
Finally, after the execution of all the policies, the query of the consumer is sent to
the protected SPARQL endpoint with the addition of the FROM and FROM NAMED
clauses (line 16). This allows the enforcement module to execute the query only on
those named graphs which are accessible, given the user information. Adding the
FROM clause is not enough because, in case the client query includes a GRAPH clause,
we need to specify the set of named graphs to be queried in a FROM NAMED clause,
otherwise the query will be executed on all the named graphs of the store. USING
and USING NAMED describe a dataset in the same way as FROM and FROM NAMED
clauses. The keyword USING instead of FROM in update requests has been chosen to
avoid possible ambiguities which could arise from writing “DELETE FROM”. The
algorithm outputs the triples resulting from Q (line 18).
Example 4. An example of client query is shown in Figure 11a, where Bob wants
to update the rock festival’s reviews26. When the query is received by the Access
Control Manager, it selects the Access Policies concerning this query (Figure 5a).
26 Notice that the client query can be every kind of query defined by the SPARQL 1.1 Query and
Update language, e.g., CONSTRUCT, SELECT.
Social Semantic Network-based Access Control 23
The Access Conditions composing the policy are then coupled with a BINDINGS
clause, as shown in Figure 10, where the ?context variable is bound to the actual
Bob’s information. Suppose Bob knows Alice, but it is also a friend of Alice’s boss
(note that these information are retrieved from Bob’s FOAF profile): the Access
Policy protecting Alice’s named graph does not grant access to Bob. After the
identification of the named graph(s) accessible by Bob (for instance, the named graph
:peter reviews), the Access Control Manager adds the USING and USING
NAMED clauses27 to constrain the execution of the client query only on the allowed
named graphs. The “secured” client query is shown in Figure 11b.
Algorithm 2 is the Access Policies Selection routine. The aim of this algorithm is
to select, starting from the consumer’s query, what are the Access Policies the query
is concerned with. The input of the algorithm is the query Q and the repository of the
policies APS. The idea is that we do not want to verify all the Access Policies every
time a query is run. Thus, we adopt a selection mechanism to obtain only a subset of
Access Policies to execute. In particular, the algorithm maps the consumer’s query to
one of the four access privileges S4AC defines (line 1). Then, the algorithm selects
all the Access Policies which have the identified Access Privilege (lines 3-7). The
selected policies are returned to the main algorithm of access enforcement.
2.2.3 Evaluation
To assess the impact on response time, we implemented the Access Control Manager
as a Java EE component and we plugged it to the Corese-KGRAM RDF store28
and SPARQL 1.1 query engine29 [12]. We evaluated the prototype on an Intel Xeon
E5540, Quad Core 2.53 GHz machine with 48GB of memory, using the Berlin
SPARQL Benchmark (BSBM) dataset 3.130.
In Figure 13, we show the execution of 10 independent runs of a test query
batch consisting in 50 identical queries of a simple SELECT over bsbm:Review
instances (tests are preceded by a warmup run). We measure the response time with
and without access control. When executed against the Access Control Manager,
the test SPARQL query is associated to the static user context. Each Access Policy
contains exactly one Access Condition. In Figure 13.a, to simulate a worst-case
scenario, access is granted to all named graphs defined in the base (i.e. all Access
Conditions return true), so that query execution does not benefit from cardinality
reduction. Larger datasets are less affected by the delay introduced by our prototype,
as datastore size plays a predominant role in query execution time (e.g. for 4M triples
and 100 always-true Access Policies we obtain a 32.6% response time delay).
27 http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-update/#deleteInsert
28 Concerning accessing inferred statements, Corese-KGRAM allows to know where are the inferred
triples. In this way, we can apply to these inferred triples the same access policies that regulate the
access to the triples from which these triples have been inferred.
29 http://www-sop.inria.fr/edelweiss/software/corese/
30 http://www4.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/bizer/BerlinSPARQLBenchmark/
spec/Dataset/
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Algorithm 1: Query Execution with Access Enforcement
Input: a SPARQL query Q, an RDF graph Gctx, Access Policy Set APS
Output: the SPARQL query result R
save Gctx in local contextual cache;
if Gctx has changed then
NGS = /0;
APS← APSelection(Q,APS);
forall the APi ∈ APS do
ACcount f alse = 0;
forall the AC j ∈ ACSi do
append Gctx to AC j as BINDINGS clause;
if ASKAC j execution returns false then
ACcount f alse ++;
if (ACSAPi is DACS and ACcount f alse < |ACSAPi |)||(ACSAPi is CACS and
ACcount f alse = 0 then
NGS← NGS∪NGAPi ;
else
NGS← NGScached ;
forall the NGi ∈ NGS do
append FROM <NGi>, FROM NAMED<NGi> to Q;
append USING <NGi>, USING NAMED<NGi> to Q;
R← run Q;
return R;
Algorithm 2: Access Policies Selection
Input: SPARQL client query Q, APS
Output: a reduced set of Access Policies APSr
AccPrvQ← map Q type to CRUD operation;
APSr = /0;
forall the APi ∈ APS do
if AccPrvAPi ≡ AccPrvQ then
APSr ← APSr ∪APi ;
return APSr;
Fig. 12: SPARQL Query Execution Procedure
In a typical scenario, the Access Control Manager restricts the results of a query.
In Figure 13.b, we assess the impact on performance for various levels of cardinality
reduction, using modified versions of the BSBM dataset featuring a larger amount of
named graphs (we define a higher number of bsbm:RatingSites, thus obtaining
more named graphs). When access is granted to a small fraction of named graphs,
the query is executed faster than the case without access control (e.g. if access is
granted to only 1% of named graphs, the query is executed 19% faster on the 1M
triple test dataset). As more named graphs and triples are accessible, performance
decreases. In particular, response time is affected by the construction of the active
Social Semantic Network-based Access Control 25
graph, determined by the merge of graphs in the FROM clauses. As shown in Figure
13.b, the cost of this operation grows with the number of named graphs returned by
the evaluation of the Access Policies.
In Figure 13.c, we analyze the overhead introduced on response time by queries
executed in dynamic user environments. We execute independent runs of 100 identical
SELECT queries, dealing with a range of context change probabilities. In case of
a context update, the query is coupled with a SPARQL 1.1 DELETE/INSERT (i.e.
update) of the context graph. Not surprisingly, with higher chances of updating
the context, the response time of the query grows, since more SPARQL queries
need to be executed. The delay of INSERT DATA or DELETE/INSERT operations
depends on the size of the triple store and on the number of named graphs (e.g. after a
DELETE query, the adopted triple store refreshes internal structures to satisfy RDFS
entailment). Performance is therefore affected by the number of active consumers,
since each of them is associated to a user context graph.
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 13: Response time overhead
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3 Related Work
3.1 XML Languages for Access Control and Digital Rights
Most of the mechanisms of access control implemented in content management
systems are based on XML languages dedicated to the description of policies of
access control and digital rights management (DRM). These systems exploit the
metadata associated with resources to which access must be controlled and these
metadata comply with the XML schemas of these dedicated languages. Among
these languages, the most famous are XrML31 (Right eXtensible Markup Language)
used as the basic language of expression rights of MPEG-2132, ODRL33(Open
Digital Right Language) implemented by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) and
XACML34 (Extensible Access Control Markup Language) developed by OASIS.
The ODRL model is based on the concepts of Asset, Party, Permission, Constraint,
Requirement, Condition, Rights holder, Context, Offer, Agreement and Revoking
rights. The XACML model allows to represent access control policies by rules. It
is based on the concepts of Rule, Policy and Policy Set and these concepts can be
refined with those of Subject, Resource, Action, Environment. A Rule comprises
Conditions and Effects and a Policy embeds Rules and Obligations.
3.2 Semantic Approaches to Access Control
With the emergence of the Web of data and people, new approaches to manage access
to content have emerged based on semantic Web models and technologies. Notably
[2] shows the limitations of solutions using non-semantic description languages for
managing access rights. They propose an OWL ontology to describe the access to
web services inspired from the XACML model. More generally, in the few existing
semantic models for managing access to content, we recognize some concepts that
were already present in the older XML languages.
The W3C initiative is also noticeable: it uses since 2001 an RDF-based system
to control access to the files of its servers: W3C ACL System35. [25] proposed
an evolution of this system to a scalable system that allows for decentralized user
authorization via an RDF metadata file containing an access control list (ACL).
The ontology used in this system is called Basic Access Control Ontology36. It is
presented as a basis to develop more sophisticated models. Our models extend it
for allowing the construction of more fine-grained access control policies. With the
31 http://www.xrml.org/
32 http://www.chiariglione.org/mpeg/standards/mpeg-21/mpeg-21.htm
33 http://www.w3.org/TR/odrl/
34 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/xacml/
35 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/20-ACLs
36 http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/acl
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AMO ontology we propose a rule-based access control, at document level (rather than
directory level). With S4AC-PRISSMA, we provide a fine-grained access control
model which grants access to specific RDF data, i.e. the data provider may want to
restrict the access to a few named graphs. Moreover, we let consumers submit any
SPARQL query, and the user information takes part into the evaluation.
Requirements in terms of access rights management in social platforms like ISICIL
are similar to those of digital libraries which [18] propose an overview. However,
one of the key issues for digital libraries is not relevant in the context of ISICIL: the
respect of the copyrights of available documents and for this purpose the protection
of documents by DRM. Indeed the documents handled by the watchers remain in the
corporate intranet or are public documents on the web. Among the work on access
management in digital libraries, we notice those of [32] on the Fedora architecture
for managing digital resources and those of [30] on the semantic Digital Library
JeromeDL.
The Fedora authors propose a model called DARS (acronym for Distributed Active
Relationships) for associating metadata to objects in a digital library, especially for
managing access rights. However, although part of the model of access management
is thus in an ontology, the Fedora system also uses XACML metadata associated
with resources the it handles.
Access management in JeromeDL is based on the EAC ontology37 (acronym for
Extensible Access Control) [29]. EAC enables to associate licenses to resources, for
each license corresponding to an access policy. For example, a license can specify
that only people of a given organization can access some resources of the library.
The purpose of EAC is to filter access to resources while that of AMO is to define
access rights associated to user roles.
Approaches of access control based on annotations of resources are particularly
well suited for social platforms. For example, in [34] end users are able to annotate
by tagging both resources and members of their social network. Access control
policies are then based on these annotations. For example, a basic policy states that
if a resource shares the same tag as a member of the social network, this member has
access to the resource. This user-centric approach is more flexible than role-centric
access control since no real role nor actions need to be defined. It does not require an
administrator user having global maitenance access rights to the system. Therefore,
it seems more dedicated to the mananagement of personnal data rather than public
shared data with many contributors (like in wikis). However, we plan to investigate
how we could combine such a user-centric approach with our role-centric approach.
Sacco and Passant [35, 36] present a Privacy Preference Ontology (PPO38), built
on top of WAC, to express fine-grained access control policies to an RDF file. In
their approach, the consumer asks to access a particular RDF file, e.g., a FOAF
profile. Their access control manager selects the part of the file the consumer can
access, and returns it to the consumer. They do not propose an access control filter
for generic SPARQL endpoints, mapping the queries with the access policies. They
37 http://www.jeromedl.org/eac/1.0/spec/index.html
38 http://vocab.deri.ie/ppo
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also specify access queries with SPARQL ASKs, but the PPO vocabulary does not
consider contextual information. They rely entirely on the WAC vocabulary without
distinguishing different kinds of Write actions, and they cannot specify conjunctive
and disjunctive sets of privacy preferences.
Muhleisen et al. [33] present a policy-enabled server for Linked Data called
PeLDS, where the access policies are expressed using a descriptive language called
PsSF, based on SWRL39. They distinguish only Read and Update actions, and
they do not consider contextual information. The system is based on an ontology
of the actions that can be performed on the datasets, but no further description is
provided.
Giunchiglia et al. [24] propose a Relation Based Access Control model (RelBAC),
a formal model of permissions based on description logic. They require to specify
who can access the data, while in our framework and in [36] the provider specifies
the attributes the consumer must satisfy.
Finin at al. [22] study how to represent RBAC using the OWL language. The
authors show also the representation of policies based on general attributes of an
action, similarly to what we present in this paper. The difference is that we specify
the policies using SPARQL 1.1 ASK queries, where the Bindings clause is used
to specify the values of the variables, and temporal and spatial constraints may be
expressed too.
Abel et al. [1] present a model of context-dependent access control at triple
level, where also contextual predicates are allowed, e.g., related to time, location,
credentials. The policies are not expressed using Semantic Web languages, but they
introduce a high level syntax then mapped to existing policy languages. They enforce
access control as a layer on top of RDF stores. They pre-evaluate the contextual
conditions, then the queries are expanded, and sent to the database.
Flouris et al. [23] present a fine-grained access control framework on top of RDF
repositories. As in our approach, the authors underline the need of a fine-grained
access control framework while being repository independent. Differently from our
framework, they do not consider the contextual dimension, and they propose a high
level specification language which has to be translated into a SPARQL/SerQL/SQL
query to enforce the policy, while we use directly SPARQL 1.1 to specify the policies.
Moreover, they focus only on read operations.
Carminati et al. [8] propose a fine-grained on-line social network access control
model based on semantic web technologies. Their main idea is to encode social
network-related information by means of an ontology. By constructing such an
ontology, the authors model the Social Network Knowledge Base. They assume that
a centralized reference monitor hosted by the social network manager will enforce
the required policies. The access control policies are encoded as SWRL40 rules. This
approach is also based on the specification of who can access the resources, i.e., the
access request is a triple (u, p,URI), where the user u requests to execute privilege p
on the resource located at URI.
39 http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
40 http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
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Stroka et al. [40] present a preliminary proposal about securing the collaborative
content on the platform KiWi. They consider global permissions, individual content
item permissions, and RDF type based permission management. They do not specify
the kind of access polices they can define.
3.3 Social Semantic Web Standards
A key specificity of the Semantic Web based approaches we adopt is to be interoper-
able with the models of the social Web and semantic Web. Specifically, SweetWiki
uses FOAF and SIOC to annotate resources and AMO complements these ontolo-
gies to manage access to content. FOAF41 (acronym for Friend Of A Friend) is an
RDF vocabulary used in social networks to describe people and and the relations
among them. SIOC42 (acronym for Semantically-Interlinked Online Communities)
is another RDF vocabulary that models the concepts of social web applications: fo-
rums, blogs, wikis. It reuses some concepts from FOAF and other popular ontologies
(Dublin Core, SKOS, etc.) and it has established itself as the standard. It is now
integrated into numerous applications such as the WordPress blog engine and its
adoption within the Linked Data43 project confirms its popularity.
FOAFRealm is an extension of FOAF proposed to collaboratively filter access to
resources based on on user profiles and their relationships in a social network. This
vocabulary is used for example in JeromeDL for filtering based on measures of trust
in a social network. Such filtering may be complementary to access control allowed
by AMO, based on user roles and types of access to resources.
Finally, the problem of authorizing access to resources which AMO adresses
is related to the problem of authentication of agents Our approaches should be
compliant with the FOAF-SSL protocol[39].
3.4 Context-oriented Access Control
A significant number of works in various research areas deal with context-aware
access control. We describe first a list of proposals not related to the Web, followed
by works targeting the Web and its evolution, the Web of Data.
Hulsebosch et al. [26] propose a context-sensitive access control infrastructure
enriched by the verification of user-provided context information. Their work shows
that context sensitive access control improves classic access control by imitating
real-world authorization procedures. They provide a comprehensive overview of
context verification techniques.
41 http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/
42 http://sioc-project.org/ontology
43 http://linkeddata.org/
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Bertino et al. [3] limit on location awareness and discuss the motivations behind
enriching access control with position data. The location verification problem is
presented, along with solutions (e.g. authenticator devices for physical location of
users). Their approach relies on geographical role-based access control (GEO-RBAC),
where users are assigned roles with given spatial validity.
Another contextual role-based approach is presented in Kulkarni and Tripathi [31].
The authors propose a context management layer in charge of authenticating the
sensors that produce context data used to evaluate access.
Shen and Cheng [38] propose a model called SCBAC which combines Semantic
Web technologies with a context-based access control mechanism. Policies are
expressed using SWRL44. The authors consider four types of contexts: subject
contexts (our User and Device dimensions), object contexts, transaction contexts (our
access privilege) and environment contexts (our Environment dimension). They do
not apply their model to the social semantic web.
Covington et al. [16] present an approach where the notion of role proposed by
RBAC [37] is used to capture the context of the environment in which the access
requests are made. The environmental roles are defined using a prolog-like logical
language for expressing policies. In a subsequent work, Covington proposes a context-
aware attribute-based access control model called CABAC [17]. They heavily rely
on contextual attributes.
Cuppens and Cuppens-Boulahia [19] propose an Organization Based Access
Control (OrBAC) model where also contextual conditions are expressed. Contextual
conditions are considered as extra statements to be satisfied to activate a security
constraint and are based on Datalog rules. A context algebra is introduced. The
main difference is that we entirely rely on Semantic Web languages. Moreover, we
consider additional context data, beyond the temporal and spatial dimensions.
Corradi et al. [13] present UbiCOSM, a security middleware adopting context
as a basic concept for policy specification and enforcement. As we do, the authors
consider context as a first-class design principle to control access to resources. They
distinguish among physical (i.e., physical spaces) and logical contexts (e.g., temporal
conditions, user activities). We add further contextual dimensions, e.g., the device.
Policies are expressed at a high level of abstraction in terms of RDF metadata. Their
approach is not applied to the Web of Data.
Toninelli et al. [42, 43] follow two design guidelines, which inspire also the
framework proposed in this paper: context-awareness to control resource access and
semantic technologies for context and policy specification. They adopt spontaneous
coalitions as an application scenario, while we deal with the Web of Data. Moreover,
the semantic technology adopted differs, i.e., rule-based approach with description
logic in their case and SPARQL 1.1 in our proposal. Their contextual information
does not include the device dimension. Finally, their solution is not meant to be
a pluggable framework for SPARQL endpoints. In a separated work, Toninelli et
al. [41] present the Proteus policy framework and discuss the role of the quality of
44 http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
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context in access control systems. In this paper, we do not take into account this
problem that is left as future work.
Fig. 14: A summarizing table about the related work.
4 Summary
Access control is a fundamental issue in the field of the Social Semantic Web. The
users aim at protecting their resources to grant the access to their data only to
authorized users. In this paper, we present two semantic access control frameworks
we introduced.
First, we have presented an ontology based model for access control. This model
is grounded on the AMO vocabulary for representing access rights to resources
and on a base of inference rules using this vocabulary to represent access control
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strategies. It has been implemented and experienced to manage access to resources
in the SweetWiki engine.
Second, we have introduced a fine-grained access control model for the Social
Semantic Web. This model is grounded on the S4AC vocabulary which allows the
users of social networks to define Access Conditions for their data. In particular,
these Access Conditions are implemented as SPARQL 1.1 ASK queries, and they can
be either conjunctively or disjunctively evaluated. Moreover, Access Policies can be
constrained w.r.t. the set of tags the resources are tagged with. The Access Evaluation
Context provides the mapping, implemented as a BINDINGS clause, between the
information about the consumer and the Access Conditions. We have presented our
Access Control Manager, realized in the context of the ISICIL social platform. The
manager grants or denies access to the users. Through an interface which allows
also non-experts to interact with the system, users can specify the Access Policies to
protect their data. The manager looks for the policies which apply to the resource, and
after checking the contextual constraints, if present, and the features of the consumer,
it states whether the access is granted or not.
There are several lines to follow for future work. First of all, in this paper we
assume that the user’s information is trustworthy. The trustworthiness of the informa-
tion sent by consumers should not be taken for granted. The User’s identity needs to
be certified: this is an open research area in the Web, and initiatives such as WebID45
specifically deal with this issue. Hulsebosch et al. [26] provide a survey of context
verification techniques (e.g. heuristics relying on context history, collaborative au-
thenticity checks). At the same time, also the other contextual information like the
time of the query or the location of the consumer when she is querying the SPARQL
endpoint have to be checked. We plan to follow the example of Toninelli et al. [41].
Second, a user evaluation campaign is needed to evaluate our access control frame-
work. The campaign aims at establishing the understandability of the framework,
the definition of the access policies from non-expert users, the explanation of the
result after the attempt to access the data, and many other features of our framework.
Third, as ubiquitous connectivity grows, access control in the Social Semantic Web
must not ignore the mobile context in which data consumption takes place. We are
currently working on a mobile access control framework which will introduce also
the device dimension to our user’s information.
The two proposals presented in this paper highlight the expressive power a
semantic-based approach to access control adds to the usual approaches. However,
our frameworks represent the first step towards a fully semantic approach to network-
based access control. Several issues still need to be addressed in this context, as
mentioned above, like privacy preservation, consumer’s trustworthiness assessment,
and user-friendly interfaces definition.
45 http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/
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